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ONLY WORDS. By Catharine A. MacKinnon. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press. 1993. Pp. v, 152. $14.95.
Professor Catharine MacKinnon's 1 short book, Only Words, has
already produced a flurry of reactions. Only a few who have reviewed
the book, which sets out MacKinnon's theoretical framework for her
campaign against pornography, have treated it, or MacKinnon,
kindly. Most have been unabashed in their criticism. Judge Richard
Posner in the New Republic, for example, labels her "reckless."2 In
the Nation, Carlin Romano closes his review, in which he invites the
reader to follow along as he fantasizes raping MacKinnon, 3 by calling
her an "authoritarian in the guise of a progressive."4 Ronald Dworkin's review in the New York Review ofBooks, while generally respectful, spells MacKinnon's first name Catherine rather than Catharine5
and includes on the opening page a caricaturized drawing of the professor with crossed arms and pursed lips, topped with a wild tornado
of voluminous hair.6
Moreover, many of the criticisms reviewers have leveled are gender
biased. For instance, Calvin Woodard states that the arguments MacKinnon employs in Only Words come merely from a woman sounding
"a heartbreaking cry for help." 7 At the same time, however, her
blunt, aggressive writing seems to have invaded a rhetorical space traditionally reserved for the words of men. Woodard, for example, labels MacKinnon "militant,"8 apparently unbothered by any
inconsistency in his characterizations. Carlin Romano gets on the
bash-MacKinnon-because-she-is-acting-like-a-man bandwagon when
he laments that "precisely because of her star power, MacKinnon
can't be laughed off. She's the lead commando in a legal phalanx
• • • • " 9 Still another reviewer uses her allotted page in the Village
Voice to muse about the possible sexual nature of MacKinnon's relationship with the recently newsworthy Jeffrey Masson. 10 The com1. Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.
2. Richard A. Posner, Obsession, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 18, 1993, at 31, 34. Judge Posner
also complains that the book contains "no nuance, qualification, measure or sense of proportion." Id. at 31.
3. Carlin Romano, Between the Motion and the Act, NATION, Nov. 15, 1993, at 563, 563.
4. Id. at 570.
5. Ronald Dworkin, Women and Pornography. N.Y. REV. OF Bo01cs, Oct. 21, 1993, at 36,
36.
6. Id.
7. Calvin Woodard, Speak No Evil, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 1994, § 7 (Book Review), at 11, 12.
8. Id. at 12.
9. Romano, supra note 3, at 564.
10. See Mim Udovitch, Imagine That, VILLAGE VOICE, Jan. 25, 1994, at 19 ("I like men
who have both [ideas and erections], preferably men who are capable of having more than one of
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bined implication seems to be that we should not take MacKinnon's
legal critiques seriously because she is a helpless commando who has a
lot of sex.
Why the hostility? Why do these reviews read more like reactions
than engagements? Did MacKinnon anticipate, or in fact even invite,
this sort of response? To answer these questions, I should first outline
what her book does.
The mere 110 pages of text divide into three parts. In the first part,
titled "Defamation and Discrimination," MacKinnon attempts to link
the production and consumption of pornography to a host of social sex
inequalities, including rape and sexual harassment (pp. 3-41). Pornography, according to MacKinnon, creates these inequalities, at least
indirectly: "Pornography does not leap off the shelf and assault women. Women could, in theory, walk safely past whole warehouses full
of it, quietly resting in its jackets. It is what it takes to make it and
what happens through its use that are the problem" (p. 15).
This cause-and-effect relationship between pornography and sex
inequality motivates MacKinnon's project, yet some writers still doubt
its empirical validity. Ronald Dworkin, no newcomer to the debate
about pornography and free speech, 11 has gone so far as to assert that
"no reputable study has concluded that pornography is a significant
cause of sexual crime: many of them conclude, on the contrary . . .
that desire for pornography is a symptom rather than a cause of
deviance." 12
Perhaps because she recognizes that the causal link remains, in
legal parlance, a disputed issue of fact, 13 she lends her claim intellectual, if not empirical, force by relying on modern speech-act theory.
Pornography, MacKinnon claims, is more than allusive; it does things:
"Its place in abuse requires understanding it more in active than in
passive terms, as constructing and performative rather than as merely
referential or connotative" (p. 21; footnote omitted).
This strategy is clever, and MacKinnon correctly identifies
J.L. Austin's How To Do Things with Words as the "original enunciaboth. (And from what one reads by and about Jeffrey Masson, that's the kind Catharine MacKinnon's got.)").
11. A 1981 article by Dworkin, for example, provides an extremely readable account of the
numerous concerns at play in this debate. See Ronald Dworkin, Is There a Right to Pornography?, 1 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 177 (1981).
12. Dworkin, supra note 5, at 38.
13. MacKinnon might fruitfully draw. here on the growing body of feminist science suggesting that, at its core, Western scientific inquiry grows out of and reinforces sex bias. See, e.g.,
SANDRA HARDING, WHOSE SCIENCE? WHOSE KNOWLEDGE? (1991). In other words, if social
science as we now experience it fails to find an empirical link between pornography and sex
crime, the failure might indicate an inability of the scientific method rather than an absence of an
actual link. Given this possible failing of science, anecdotal evidence of a connection - the very
kind MacKinnon employs - might be the best we can rely on in ascertaining the relationship of
pornography to behavior.
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tion of the theory of performative speech." 14 A useful exploration of
what pornography does, however, in all its various modes of production, commerce, and consumption, would require a more textured understanding of speech-act theory than the streamlined account
MacKinnon gives in Only Words. Although the paradigmatic speech
act - a minister's pronouncing a couple man and wife or a jury's
finding a defendant guilty - is easily understood as an act in addition
to an utterance, pornography pushes the bounds of the paradigm. For
example, the only utterances. in pornography are usually written down
or taped on film or videocassette. Thus, the performer of the alleged
speech act is rarely in the presence of his or her audience, the obvious
exception being the case of live sex shows. Can "speech" in such a
circumstance be or have the effect of a speech act? That is, are speech
acts iterable? If I want to marry Jane Doe, can I play a recording of a
minister proclaiming us to be married, or would the performance of
marriage require the minister's presence?
Questions such as these have spawned a significant literature building on and critiquing Austin's ideas, particularly focusing on the problem of iterability of performative speech. Jacques Derrida, for
instance, has observed "the possibility for every performative utterance (and a priori every other utterance) to be 'quoted.' " 15 Austin,
however, considered reiterated speech acts hollow, void: "[L]anguage
in such circumstances [of reiteration] is in special ways - intelligibly
- used not seriously, but in ways parasitic upon its normal use ....
All this we are excluding from consideration." 16 To Derrida, Austin's
bracketing of this crucial element of performative speech - its iterability - renders the Austinian version of speech-act theory flawed, or
at least incomplete. 17 If Derrida is correct and Austin's description of
the performative does not seek to explain the nature and effects of
reiterated speech, then where is the Austinian performative speech in
pornography? Who is saying what to whom and in what context?
This all is not to say that the "speech" in pornography does not create
inequality; the discussion merely suggests that MacKinnon needs to
look beyond Austin if she hopes to describe accurately the mechanisms by which pornography "performs" its dirty work. 18
14. P. 21 n.31 (citing J.L. AUSTIN, How To Do THINGS WITH WORDS (1962)).
15. JACQUES DERRIDA, Signature Event Context, in LIMITED INC l, 16 (Gerald Graff ed.,
Samuel Weber & Jeffrey Mehlman trans., 2d ed. 1990).
16. AUSTIN, supra note 14, at 22.
17. See DERRIDA, supra note 15, at 17 ("For, ultimately, isn't it true that what Austin excludes as anomaly, exception, 'non-serious,' citation (on stage, in a poem, or a soliloquy) is the
determined modification of a general citationality - or rather, a general iterability - without
which there would not even be a 'successful' performative?" (footnote omitted)).
18. Consider, in this light, an example of harm MacKinnon attributes to pornography: "In
pornography, women are gang raped so they can be filmed." P. 15. Speech-act theory sheds
little light on the mechanism by which this harm occurs. What is the speech here and what is it
doing? Speech-act theory might help to explain, for instance, why the video broadcast of the
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MacKinnon's vivid description of pornography and its effects 19
suffers from another weakness as well: it fails to address the potential
harm of pornography to men. 20 That is, perhaps male consumers of
pornography also suffer by their exposure to it. The damage to men
would be of a different sort than the damage to women; it would be a
degradation and corruption of men's views of sexuality, and perhaps,
the argument might go, the law should discourage activity or commerce that corrupts and degrades. According to Ronald Dworkin,
this argument grows out of
the hypothesis that humans will develop differently and in fact best, and
find the most suitable conditions for their own flourishing, if their law
cultivates an ennobling rather than a degrading attitude towards their
sexual activity by prohibiting, even in private, practices that are in fact
perversions or corruptions of the sexual experience.21

To be sure, arguing that pornography hurts men would be secondary
to the thrust of MacKinnon's argument - that pornography creates
sex inequality - but such an argument might be useful from a strategic standpoint. Given that Only Words has been described, perhaps
unfairly, as "radiat[ing] the kind of hostility, resentment and contempt
toward men that MacKinnon skewers men for expressing toward women,"22 MacKinnon would benefit by at least acknowledging the interest men might have in ensuring the success of her campaign.23
Regardless of these shortcomings, the first part of the book effectively performs its intended function. It recasts the reality of what
pornography does - or at least what MacKinnon says it does - and
contrasts that with what First Amendment law thinks pornography
says:
gang rape has a particular effect on someone; it does not help disentangle the harms intrinsic in
the production of pornography from the speech doctrine that protects the finished product.
19. See, e.g., p. 19 ("Sooner or later, in one way or another, the consumers want to live out
the pornography further in three dimensions. Sooner or later, in one way or another, they do.").
20. I am not speaking here about gay male pornography, which - at least according to John
Stoltenberg, a compatriot of both MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin - also finds its roots in
misogyny and perpetuates sex inequality by eroticizing sexual dominance. See generally John
Stoltenberg, Gays and the Pornography Movement: Having the Hots for Sex Discrimination, in
MEN CoNFRONT PORNOGRAPHY 248 (Michael S. Kimmel ed., 1991). Stoltenberg reasons that
gay pornography, because it calls upon the same vocabulary as straight pornography, reinforces
misogyny, which in turn perpetuates homophobia.
21. Dworkin, supra note 11, at 189.
22. Romano, supra note 3, at 564.
23. On the other hand, such a gesture might undermine MacKinnon's pungent rhetorical
strategy of addressing the book to the individual female reader. She begins the first page with an
imperative: "Imagine ... [y]ou grow up with your father holding you down and covering your
mouth so another man can make a horrible searing pain between your legs." P. 3. In case the
reader glosses over this syntactic slap, MacKinnon reiterates the point, using you or your a total
of 30 times on the first page alone. She thus forces even male readers to participate in her
imagined reality. If she were later to make a separate nod to any potential male readers, she
would undermine the power and universality of her initial command that each of us envision
himself or herself as suffering the harms pornography visits upon women.
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In ... the approach of current law, pornography is essentially treated
as defamation rather than as discrimination. That is, it is conceived in
terms of what it says ... rather than in terms of what it does. Fundamentally, in this view, a form of communication cannot, as such, do anything bad except offend. [p. 11; footnote omitted]

This reconception of pornography as something that does something
in addition to saying something is critical to the antipornography
movement. Without it, pornography remains protected expression.
Having presented her argument for a reconception of pornography
in Part I, MacKinnon returns to safer ground in Part II, titled "Racial
and Sexual Harassment" (pp. 43-68). Her purpose here is to bolster
the arguments in Part I, or at least make them more palatable, by
immersing the reader in an area of law and life in which words have
long been viewed as acts: "If ever words have been understood as acts,
it has been when they are sexual harassment.... Only words - yet
they have not been seen as conveying ideas ..." (p. 45). MacKinnon
attempts to show how absurd it would be to characterize behavior we
now label as harassment as expression worthy of constitutional protection. 24 With the harms of pornography fresh in the memory from Part
I, the reader, MacKinnon hopes, will see that pornography is really
just like harassment, and so protection of pornography is just as absurd as would be protection of harassment.
This strategy - showing that pornography is identical in relevant
respects to something the law already prohibits - is really just an
instance of traditional analogical reasoning; it is like saying, "Pornography is more like harassment than speech, so we should treat it like
harassment." Given the traditional method of this element of MacKinnon's argument, it seems odd to read Judge Posner maligning the
book as "a verbal torrent that appeals ... to elemental passions (fear,
disgust, anger, hatred) rather than to the rational intellect."25 The
strategy, to the contrary, displays just the sort of reasoning law professors hope to impart to their students through the case method and
analysis of hypothetical fact patterns.
Despite its appeal, simplicity, and traditional structure, however,
the analogical argument may not be strong enough alone to support a
wholesale shift in the regulation of pornography. In the first place,
Title VII creates a civil cause of action to counter only workplace harassment. 26 A woman targeted for sexual harassment on the street or
24. For example, she observes:
The workplace comment "Black women taste like sardines" has not been construed as a
possible advertisement for fish, hence protected commercial speech.... When a man slips a
woman's paycheck into his pants and requires her to "go for it," nobody suggests he is
making a militant display of dissent against the economic system.
P. 47 (footnote omitted).
25. Posner, supra note 2, at 31.
26. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63-67, 73 (1986) (recognizing a cause of action
for workplace harassment under Title VII).
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in the home remains, according to the law, merely offended, notwithstanding that nonworkplace harassment probably also contributes to
sex inequality. Thus, if we were to treat pornography as we treat harassment, where would we prohibit it? Everywhere? Only where women's equality matters most?
The analogical argument also falters because it unfairly underestimates the force of expressive concerns in the debate regarding just
how far antiharassment regulation should go. MacK.innon admits
that courts are now considering the extent to which campus speech
codes, for instance, impinge on speech rights. 27 However, she never
directly faces the implications of the growing concern over the conflict
between harassment law and speech law for her analogical argument.
If the judicial and academic trend is to pay increasing attention to the
expression suppressed by harassment law, then MacK.innon might
want to rethink whether she really wants the law to treat pornography
the same way it treats harassment.
These criticisms, however, are really no more than quibbles. The
question MacK.innon asks - Why should we treat pornography more
like speech than harassment? - is valid. From an ahistorical standpoint, it has no compelling answer. Of course, MacKinnon does know
how legal protection of pornography developed historically:
In America, the examples that provide the life resonance of the expressive freedom, the backdrop of atrocities for the ringing declarations, derive mostly from attempts to restrict the political speech of communists
during the McCarthy era. . . . The story of the First Amendment is an
epic story of overcoming that, of progress, of making sure it never happens again. [pp. 74-75]

Thus, she argues in Part III - "Equality and Speech" - that First
Amendment doctrine has developed an unwarranted obsession with
protection of speech that is in one way or another unpopular (pp. 71110). She labels this obsession the" 'speech you hate' test .... You
can tell you are being principled by the degree to which you abhor
what you allow" (p. 75).
MacKinnon argues in this last part of her book, however, that our
experiences with McCarthyism need not be the only historical backdrop against which we develop our First Amendment doctrine.
Equally important, if not more so, are the values embodied in the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. MacK.innon
rightfully wonders why modern speech doctrine, which postdates the
Fourteenth Amendment, largely ignores equality concerns. 28 For
27. The potential conflict between speech rights and workplace harassment law is beginning
to receive scholarly attention as well. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Comment, Freedom of Speech
and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1791 (1992).
28. See, for example, p. 71:
[T]he First Amendment has grown as if a commitment to speech were no part of a commitment to equality and as if a commitment to equality had no implications for the law of
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instance, the state protects nude dancing as speech, yet nude dancing
arguably contributes to sex inequality by exposing women to harms
because of their sex. If so, the Constitution might require the state to
recognize that the equality guarantee limits or even trumps the alleged
speech right protecting the dancing. 29 Our Constitution is, as MacKinnon notes, "a document that accepts balancing among constitutional interests as method" (p. 84). In suggesting that the Fourteenth
Amendment might provide limits on speech rights independent of
those deriving from the First Amendment itself, MacKinnon performs
once again her classic move. Just as she has done with so many other
legal issues, 30 she recasts pornography as an instance of sex inequality.
Of course, even MacKinnon accepts that in a true balancing of
interests, equality might not always win. 31 All she wants is a "fair
fight ... between equality and speech as two constitutional values" (p.
85). This request is really quite modest, especially when posed to her
adversaries who presumably incant the "marketplace of ideas" mantra. Reviewers, however, have balked at the idea of exposing First
Amendment freedoms to equality scrutiny. Ronald Dworkin, for instance, worries that "the frightening principle that considerations of
equality require that some people not be free to express their tastes or
convictions" could lead to government censorship of any material that
"might reasonably offend a disadvantaged group. " 32 Even though
speech - as if the upheaval that produced the Reconstruction Amendments did not move
the ground under the expressive freedom, setting new limits and mandating new extensions,
perhaps even demanding reconstruction of the speech right itself.
Id.
.
29. It might also be proper to question whether affirmative state protection of behavior that
works an inequality on a protected group also works an "expressive harm" on that group. Cf.
Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Biza"e Districts," and Voting
Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REv. 483,
506-07 (1993) ("An expressive harm is one that results from the ideas or attitudes expressed
through a governmental action, rather than from the more tangible or material consequences the
action brings about. On this view, the meaning of a governmental action is just as important as
what the action does."). In other words, even if First Amendment doctrine would argue for
protection of a certain form of expression, resonances from governmental failure to protect the
targets of that expression might nevertheless militate against protection.
30. MacKinnon has argued that the law should view a number of topics through the lens of
sex inequality and treat laws that affect these topics as governed by the Equal Protection Clause.
Among these topics are rape, see. e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality
Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1301 (1991) ("Women are sexually assaulted because they are
women: not individually or at random •..."); reproduction, see, e.g., id. at 1309 ("[W]omen,
because of their sex, are subjected to social inequality at each step in the process of procreation."); homosexuality, see, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY
OF THE STATE 248 (1989) (arguing that in a world viewed through a sex equality lens, "[g]ay and
lesbian rights would be recognized as sex equality rights"); and sexual harassment, see, e.g.,
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Sexual Harassment: Its First Decade in Court, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 103, 109 (1987) (stating that "sexual harassment is sex-based discrimination").
31. For instance, in imagining how her constitutional scheme might play out in the courts,
she reckons that "pornography ordinances and hate crime provisions fail constitutiopal scrutiny
that they might, with constitutional equality support, survive." P. 85.
32. Dworkin, supra note 5, at 40.
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Dworkin overstates MacKinnon's argument, 33 his fear of what
government might do with this equality-justified license to censor may
not be wholly unfounded. The Canadian Supreme Court, for instance,
has upheld laws restricting hate propaganda34 and obscenity, 35 relying
largely on equality principles. The repercussions of these decisions,
however, may not be identical to those for which MacKinnon and
others had hoped. One opinion piece in the New York Times has
noted that MacKinnon has become the target of widespread anger
among Canadian artists, writers, and activists. 36 Apparently, Canadian authorities have used the terms "degrading and dehumanizing"
- terms lifted straight from the judicial opinion MacKinnon champions in Only Words as a victory for women - to justify seizing lesbian,
gay, and feminist material and fining a bookstore owner for selling a
lesbian magazine. 37
These acts of censorship and harassment might demonstrate the
danger of misapplying MacKinnon's vision of an equality-tempered
speech right, but they do not prove the theory is flawed. Presumably,
MacKinnon would argue that Canadian heterosexuals were not at risk
of sexual abuse and assault as a result of the sale of lesbian literature.
Thus, those who found the materials degrading - nonlesbians - were
not deserving of equality protection, for "[i]n this new model, principle will be defined in terms of specific experiences, the particularity of
history, substantively rather than abstractly. It will notice who is being hurt and never forget who they are" (p. 109).
With her argument that the constitutional equality guarantee
should inform free speech doctrine, MacKinnon has brought the
reader full circle, back to the opening pages of the book in which she
attempts to link pornography to social inequality. The structure of the
argument is simple: First, show that pornography harms women 33. Throughout the book, MacKinnon makes clear that "offense" is neither her target nor
her motivation. It seems unlikely then that she would ever approve a constitutional scheme
whereby mere offense on the part of a member of a disadvantaged group would justify curtailing
established First Amendment freedoms. The civil statute she and Andrea Dworkin drafted created a civil cause of action through which women harmed through pornography could sue to
"prove its role in their abuse, to recover for the deprivation of their civil rights, and to stop it
from continuing." P. 92. Offense, under this statute, is not among the harms constituting a
deprivation of civil rights. Ronald Dworkin's fear, therefore, may direct itself to a straw man
argument. Admittedly, however, MacKinnon does occasionally appear dismissive of the value of
speech rights. See, e.g., p. 108 ("Wherever equality is mandated, racial and sexual epithets, vilification, and abuse should be able to be prohibited, unprotected by the First Amendment.").
34. See Regina v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (Can.).
35. See Butler v. Regina, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 (Can.).
36. Leanne Katz, Censors' Helpers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1993, at 15. It would seem that
almost everyone - conservatives, liberals, artists, writers, activists - opposes MacKinnon's antipornography campaign. She does retain some powerful allies, however, including, apparently,
Mother Nature. The vast majority of pornographic videos are produced in Southern California's
San Fernando Valley - directly above the epicenter of the recent Northridge earthquake. X·
rated Industry Is Disrupted, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1994, at Al 1.
37. Katz, supra note 36, at 15.
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that is, that it creates inequality. Next, show that pornography is similar to harassment, an issue the law already views as raising equality
concerns. Finally, make a structural argument that the Constitution
itself requires the law to examine pornography through an equality
lens. This argument in itself does not appear particularly offensive, so
we are still left with the question: Why have the reactions to the book
and its author been so hostile?
The answer must lie not in what the book says but in how it says it.
Only Words does not read like a law review article. 38 Instead, MacKinnon takes every opportunity to display her rhetorical strengths.
She knows and uses the emotional punch of sharply visual and visceral
language. 39 This style is often riveting, always challenging. Occasionally, however, the speed of MacKinnon's language seems to get the
better of her. For instance, in an effort to force the reader to break out
of a particular thought paradigm, she frequently simply pronounces
that something is or is not something the reader probably never before
thought it was or was not: "You find that the pictures, far from making what happened undeniable, are sex ...." (p. 4). "What was words
and pictures becomes, through masturbation, sex itself" (p. 25).
These equivalences frequently seem to get caught in their own syntax
and the point is lost: "In pornography, pictures and words are sex.
At the same time, in the world pornography creates, sex is pictures
and words. As sex becomes speech, speech becomes sex" (p. 26). "Socalled speech that works as a sex act is not an argument. An orgasm is
not an argument and cannot be argued with" (p. 63). "When words of
sexual abuse are in our mouths, that is pornography, and we become
pornography because that is what pornography is" (p. 66).
So what. My guess is that among the reasons MacKinnon chose to
write Only Words as a book was to avoid the constraints student editors of law reviews impose on authors. The Michigan Law Review, for
instance, would probably have required MacKinnon to footnote each
of the equivalences quoted above. We would have advised her that her
argument would be more accessible if she were to tone down some of
her rhetoric. We would have asked her to provide readers early on
with a roadmap to her piece, so as to guide the reader gently through
her argument step by step.
Only Words, however, is a book, not a law review article. That
MacKinnon made the risky choice40 to write it in a discomforting
38. With only 110 small pages of text and 192 endnotes, however, it is about the length ofa
moderately sized law review article.
39. See, e.g., p. 17 ("With pornography, men masturbate to women being exposed, humiliated, violated, degraded, mutilated, dismembered, bound, gagged, tortured, and killed.•.. The
women are in two dimensions, but the men have sex with them in their own three-dimensional
bodies, not in their minds alone. Men come doing this.").
40. I claim that MacKinnon chose to write Only Words the way she did because, in comparing this book with her other writings, it becomes obvious she can write in the traditional aca-
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style is to her credit. Moreover, books, as evidenced by this issue of
the Michigan Law Review, get reviewed. They get attention. Only
Words has received attention largely because of the way MacKinnon
wrote it. She must have intended this.
If so, then Catharine MacKinnon has pulled off something really
quite clever. Her book, of course, is only words, yet it has incited
unbridled anger and verbal abuse. Carlin Romano expressed his fury
by imagining raping the professor. MacKinnon claims the publication
of this fantasy actually raped her. 41 Only words, yet look at the responses, look at the rage directed toward the professor. These responses and the anger and fear that lurk within them have in a sense
become part of the text of Only Words; to read them is to read a part
of what MacKinnon aimed to show. Like the pornography she hopes
will someday reside only "in a glass case next to the dinosaur skeletons
in the Smithsonian" (p. 110), MacKinnon's words have engendered
real abuse, directed at her as a woman. In short, she has proved her
point.
-

David C. Dinie//i

demic mode. See, for example, her 1991 Yale Law Journal article: MacK.innon, Reflections on
Sex Equality Under Law, supra note 30. She clearly knows how to write in a manner that garners critical approval. Telling is the newest paperback cover of Feminism Unmodified, which
quotes a glowing review from the New York Times: '1Feminism Unmodified] is passionate,
brilliant ••• [.] MacK.innon offers a systematic and persuasive perspective on issues that are
central not only to feminism but to social theory in general." MAcKJNNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 30, at front cover (quoting Alison M. Jaggar, Male and Female, Men and
Women, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1987, § 7 (Book Review), at 3).
41. Richard Lacayo, Assault by Paragraph, TIME, Jan. 17, 1994, at 62.

